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This paper presents the econometric approach to causal modeling. It is motivated by pol-
icy problems. New causal parameters are deﬁned and identiﬁed to address speciﬁc policy
problems. Economists embrace a scientiﬁc approach to causality and model the preferences
and choices of agents to infer subjective (agent) evaluations as well as objective outcomes.
Anticipated and realized subjective and objective outcomes are distinguished. Models for
simultaneous causality are developed. The paper contrasts the Neyman–Rubin model of
causality with the econometric approach.
Keywords: causality, econometrics, Roy model, Neyman–Rubin model, subjective and ob-
jective evaluations, anticipated vs. realized outcomes, counterfactuals, treatment eﬀects
1 Introduction
Economists and statisticians make causal inferences and draw, in part, on a common set
of tools. Economists focus on causality from the perspective of policy evaluation. Causal
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1parameters and causal inferences in economics are motivated by policy questions. Diﬀerent
policy questions require diﬀerent parameters, so there is no universal causal parameter or
set of parameters. This paper informs statisticians of developments in economics that are
useful in addressing policy problems.
The econometric approach develops explicit models of outcomes where the causes of ef-
fects are investigated and the mechanisms governing the choice of treatment are analyzed.
The relationship between treatment outcomes and treatment choice mechanisms is studied.
A careful accounting of the unobservables in outcome and treatment choice equations facil-
itates the design of estimators. Both objective and subjective evaluations are considered,
where subjective valuations are those of the person receiving treatment as well as the persons
assigning it. Diﬀerences between anticipated and realized objective and subjective outcomes
are analyzed. Models for simultaneous treatment eﬀects are developed. A careful distinc-
tion is made between models for potential outcomes and empirical methods for identifying
treatment eﬀects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 distinguishes three distinct problems in analyz-
ing causal models and deﬁnes the econometric approach. Section 3 discusses the variety of
policy evaluation questions and causal parameters used by economists. Section 4 discusses
counterfactuals, causality and structural econometric models and contrasts the econometric
approach with the approach adopted in statistics. Section 5 presents a synthesis of the two
approaches.
2 The Econometric Approach
Counterfactuals are possible outcomes in diﬀerent hypothetical states of the world. An ex-
ample would be the health outcomes for a person associated with taking or not taking a drug.
Causal comparisons entail contrasts between outcomes in possible states deﬁned so that only
the presence or absence of the drug varies across the states. The person receiving the drug
2is the same as the person who does not, except for treatment status and, possibly, the out-
come associated with treatment status. The problem of causal inference is to assess whether
manipulation of the treatment, holding all other factors constant, aﬀects outcomes. The
concept of causality developed in this paper and in the statistical treatment eﬀect literature
is based on the notion of controlled variation—variation in treatment holding other factors
constant. It is distinct from other notions of causality based on prediction (e.g. Granger,
1969, and Sims, 1972). Holland (1986) makes useful distinctions among commonly invoked
deﬁnitions of causality. Cartwright (2004) discusses a variety of deﬁnitions of causality from
a philosopher’s perspective.
The econometric approach to causal inference carefully distinguishes three problems:
(a) Deﬁning counterfactuals, (b) Identifying causal models from idealized data of population
distributions (inﬁnite samples without any sampling variation), and (c) Identifying causal
models from actual data, where sampling variability is an issue. The contrast between (b)
and (c) arises from the diﬀerence between empirical distributions based on sampled data and
population distributions generating the data. Table 1 delineates the three distinct problems.
Table 1: Three Distinct Tasks Arising in the Analysis of Causal Models
Task Description Requirements
1 Deﬁning the Set of Hypotheticals A Scientiﬁc Theory
or Counterfactuals
2 Identifying Causal Parameters from Mathematical Analysis of
Hypothetical Population Data Point or Set Identiﬁcation
3 Identifying Parameters from Estimation and
Real Data Testing Theory
The ﬁrst problem entails the application of science, logic and imagination. It is also
partly a matter of convention. A model of counterfactuals is more widely accepted the more
widely accepted are its ingredients, which are the rules used to derive a model, including
whether or not the rules of logic and mathematics are followed, and its agreement with
established theories. Models are descriptions of hypothetical worlds obtained by varying—
hypothetically—the factors determining outcomes. Models are not empirical statements or
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worlds and they are often abstract representations of empirical descriptions.
The second problem (b) is one of inference in very large samples. Can one recover
counterfactuals (or means or distributions of counterfactuals) from data that are free of any
sampling variation? This is the identiﬁcation problem.
The third problem is one of inference in practice. Can one recover a given model or a
desired counterfactual from a given set of data? Solutions to this problem entail issues of
inference and testing in real world samples. This is the problem most familiar to statisticians
and empirical social scientists. The boundary between problems (b) and (c) is permeable
depending on how “the data” are deﬁned.
Some of the controversy surrounding construction of counterfactuals and causal models
is partly a consequence of analysts being unclear about these three distinct problems and
often confusing them. Particular methods of estimation (e.g., matching or instrumental
variable estimation) have become associated with “causal inference” in some circles, and
even the deﬁnition of certain “causal parameters”, because issues of deﬁnition, identiﬁcation
and estimation have sometimes been conﬂated.
The econometric approach to policy evaluation separates these problems and emphasizes
the provisional nature of causal knowledge. Some statisticians reject the notion of the provi-
sional nature of causal knowledge and seek an assumption-free approach to causal inference
(see, e.g., Tukey, 1986). However, human knowledge advances by developing theoretical
models and testing them against data. The models used are inevitably provisional and de-
pend on a priori assumptions. Even randomization, properly executed, cannot answer all of
the relevant causal questions.
Many “causal models” in statistics are incomplete guides to interpreting data or for sug-
gesting answers to particular policy questions. They are motivated by the experiment as an
ideal. They do not clearly specify the mechanisms determining how hypothetical counter-
factuals are realized or how hypothetical interventions are implemented except to compare
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the model for selecting outcomes only implicitly speciﬁed. The construction of counterfactual
outcomes is based on appeals to intuition and not on formal models.
Because the mechanisms determining outcome selection are not modeled in the statis-
tical approach, the metaphor of “random assignment” is often adopted. This emphasis on
randomization or its surrogates, like matching or instrumental variables, rules out a variety
of alternative channels of identiﬁcation of counterfactuals from population or sample data.
The focus on randomization has practical consequences because of the conﬂation of Task 1
with Tasks 2 and three in Table 1. Since randomization is used to deﬁne the parameters
of interest, this practice sometimes leads to the confusion that randomization is the only
way—or at least the best way—to identify causal parameters from real data. Extreme
versions of this approach deny causal status to any intervention that cannot in principle be
implemented by a practical, real world experiment.
One reason why many statistical models are incomplete is that they do not specify the
sources of randomness generating variability among agents, i.e., they do not specify why
otherwise observationally identical people make diﬀerent choices and have diﬀerent outcomes
given the same choice. They do not distinguish what is in the agent’s information set from
what is in the observing statistician’s information set, although the distinction is fundamental
in justifying the properties of any estimator for solving selection and evaluation problems.
They do not distinguish uncertainty from the point of view of the agent whose behavior
is being analyzed from variability as analyzed by the observing analyst. They are also
incomplete because they are recursive. They do not allow for simultaneity in choices of
outcomes of treatment that are at the heart of game theory and models of social interactions
and contagion (see, e.g., Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Tamer, 2003).
Economists since Haavelmo (1943, 1944) have recognized the value of precise models for
constructing counterfactuals, for answering “causal” questions and addressing more general
policy evaluation questions. The econometric framework is explicit about how models of
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ment”), and the sources of unobservables in treatment allocations and outcomes and their
relationship. Rather than leaving the rules governing selection of treatment implicit, the
econometric approach uses explicit relationships between the unobservables in outcome and
selection mechanisms to identify causal models from data and to clarify the nature of iden-
tifying assumptions.
The goal of the econometric literature, like the goal of all science, is to understand the
causes producing eﬀects so that one can use empirical versions of the models to forecast the
eﬀects of interventions never previously experienced, to calculate a variety of policy counter-
factuals and to use scientiﬁc theory to guide the choices of estimators and the interpretation
of the evidence. These activities require development of a more elaborate theory than is
envisioned in the current literature on causal inference in statistics.
Many causal models in statistics are black-box devices designed to investigate the impact
of “treatments”—often complex packages of interventions—on observed outcomes in a given
environment. Unbundling the components of complex treatments is rarely done. Explicit
scientiﬁc models go into the black box to explore the mechanism(s) producing the eﬀects.
In the terminology of Holland (1986), the distinction is between understanding the “eﬀects
of causes” (the goal of the treatment eﬀect literature as a large group of statisticians deﬁne
it) or understanding the “causes of eﬀects” (the goal of the econometric literature building
explicit models).
By focusing on one narrow black-box question, the treatment eﬀect literature avoids
many of the problems confronted in the econometrics literature that builds explicit models
of counterfactuals and assignment mechanisms. This is its great virtue. At the same time,
it produces parameters that are more limited in application. Without further assumptions,
these parameters do not lend themselves to extrapolation out of sample or to accurate
forecasts of impacts of other policies besides the ones being empirically investigated. By
not being explicit about the contents of the black-box (understanding the causes of eﬀects),
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parameters obtained from other studies as well as scientiﬁc intuition to supplement available
information in the data in hand. It lacks the ability to provide explanations for estimated
“eﬀects” grounded in theory. When the components of treatments vary across studies,
knowledge does not accumulate across treatment eﬀect studies, whereas it does accumulate
across studies estimating models generated from common parameters that are featured in
the econometric approach.
3 Policy Evaluation Questions and Criteria of Interest
This section presents three central policy evaluation questions. Individual level treatment
eﬀects are deﬁned and the evaluation problem is discussed in general terms.
3.1 Three Policy Evaluation Problems Considered in This Paper
Three broad classes of policy evaluation problems are considered in economics. Policy eval-
uation problem one is:
P1 Evaluating the Impact of Historical Interventions on Outcomes Including Their Impact
in Terms of the Well-Being of the Treated and Society at Large
By historical, I mean documented interventions. A variety of outcomes and criteria are
used to form these evaluations depending on the question at hand. Economists distinguish
objective or public outcomes that can in principle be measured by all external observers
from “subjective” outcomes that are the evaluations of the agents experiencing treatment
(e.g. patients) or the agents prescribing treatment (e.g., physicians). Objective outcomes
are intrinsically ex post (“after the fact”) in nature. The statistical literature on causal
inference focuses exclusively on ex post objective outcomes. Subjective outcomes can be ex
ante (“anticipated”) or ex post. Thus the outcome of a medical trial produces both a cure
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diﬀerent from ex post realized pain and suﬀering. Agents may also have ex ante evaluations
of the objective outcomes that may diﬀer from their ex post evaluations. By impact I mean
constructing either individual level or population level counterfactuals and their valuations.
By well-being, I mean the valuations of the outcomes obtained from the intervention of the
agents being analyzed or some other party (e.g., the parents of the agent or “society” at
large). They may be ex ante or ex post. P1 is the problem of internal validity. It is the
problem of identifying a given treatment parameter or a set of treatment parameters in a
given environment.
Most policy evaluation is designed with an eye toward the future and toward informing
decisions about new policies and application of old policies to new environments. It is helpful
to distinguish a second problem encountered in policy analysis.
P2 Forecasting the Impacts (Constructing Counterfactual States) of Interventions Imple-
mented in one Environment in Other Environments, Including Their Impacts In Terms
of Well-Being.
Included in these interventions are policies described by generic characteristics (e.g., tax or
beneﬁt rates or therapy used, including intensity) that are applied to diﬀerent groups of
people or in diﬀerent time periods from those studied in implementations of the policies
on which data are available. This is the problem of external validity: taking a treatment
parameter or a set of parameters estimated in one environment to another environment (see,
e.g., Shadish & Cook, 2007). The environment includes the characteristics of individuals and
of the treatments.
Finally, the most ambitious problem is forecasting the eﬀect of a new policy, never pre-
viously experienced.
P3 Forecasting the Impacts of Interventions (Constructing Counterfactual States Associated
with Interventions) Never Historically Experienced to Various Environments, Including
8Their Impacts in Terms of Well-Being.
This problem requires that one use past history to forecast the consequences of new policies.
It is a fundamental problem in knowledge. P3 is a problem that economic policy analysts have
to solve daily. I now present a framework within which analysts can address these problems
in a systematic fashion. It is also a framework that can be used for causal inference.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Individual Level Treatment Eﬀects
To evaluate is to value and to compare values among possible outcomes. These are two
distinct tasks. Deﬁne outcomes corresponding to state (policy, treatment) s for an agent ω
as Y (s,ω), ω ∈ Ω. The agent can be a household, a patient, a ﬁrm, or a country. One can
think of Ω as a universe of agents. Assume that Ω = [0,1]. Y (·,·) may be vector valued, but
to simplify the exposition, I work with scalar outcomes. (See Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007a,
for an analysis with vector outcomes.)
The Y (s,ω) are outcomes realized after treatments are chosen. In advance of treatment,
agents may not know the Y (s,ω) but may make forecasts about them. These forecasts may
inﬂuence their decisions to participate in the program or may inﬂuence the agents who make
decisions about whether or not an individual participates in the program. Selection into the
program based on actual or anticipated components of outcomes gives rise to the selection
problem in the evaluation literature.
Let S be the set of possible treatments with elements denoted by s. For simplicity of
exposition, assume that this set is the same for all ω. For each ω, one obtains a collection
of possible outcomes given by {Y (s,ω)}s∈S. For simplicity, I assume that the set S is ﬁnite
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007a, consider more general cases). For example, if S = {0,1}, there
are two treatments, one of which may be a no-treatment state (e.g., Y (0,ω) is the outcome
for an agent ω not getting a treatment like a drug, schooling or access to a new technology,
while Y (1,ω) is the outcome in treatment state 1 for agent ω getting the drug, schooling
or access). A two treatment environment receives the most attention in the theoretical
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in practice.
Each “state” (treatment) may consist of a compound of subcomponent states. In this
case, one can deﬁne s itself as a vector (e.g., s = (s1,s2,...,sK) for K components) cor-
responding to the diﬀerent components that comprise treatment. Thus a medical protocol
typically consists of a package of treatments. One might be interested in the package of one
(or more) of its components. Thus s1 might be months of treatment with one drug, s2 the
quality of physicians, and so forth. No generality is lost by assuming that s is a scalar, since
each distinct treatment can be given a distinct label.
The outcomes may be time subscripted, with Yt (s,ω) corresponding to outcomes of
treatment measured at diﬀerent times. The index set for t may be the integers, corresponding
to discrete time, or an interval, corresponding to continuous time. In principle, one could
index S by t, which may be deﬁned on the integers, corresponding to discrete time, or
an interval corresponding to continuous time. The Yt (s,ω) are realized or ex post (after
treatment) outcomes. When choosing treatment, these values may not be known. Gill &
Robins (2001), Van der Laan & Robins (2003), Abbring & Van den Berg (2003), Abbring
& Heckman (2007, 2008), and Heckman & Navarro (2007) develop models for dynamic
counterfactuals, where time-subscripted and ω-subscripted S arise as information accrues.
Throughout this essay I keep the time subscript implicit.
The individual treatment eﬀect for agent ω comparing objective outcomes of treat-
ment s with objective outcomes of treatment s0 is
Y (s,ω) − Y (s
0,ω), s 6= s
0, (3.1)
for two elements s,s0 ∈ S. This is also called an individual level causal eﬀect. The causal
eﬀect is the Marshallian (1890) ceteris paribus change of outcomes for an agent across states
s and s0. Only s and s0 are varied.
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the well-being of participants as well as the objective outcomes (see Heckman & Smith,
1998). Although statisticians often reason in terms of assignment mechanisms, economists
recognize that agent preferences often govern actual choices. Comparisons across outcomes
can be made in terms of utilities (personal, R(Y (s,ω),ω), or in terms of planner preferences
or physician preferences, RG, or both types of comparisons might be made for the same
outcome and their agreement or conﬂict evaluated). Utility functions produce subjective
valuations of outcomes by the agents being treated or the planner.
To simplify the notation, and at the same time allow for more general possibilities for
arguments of the valuation function, write R(Y (s,ω),ω) as R(s,ω), suppressing the explicit
dependence of R on Y (s,ω). In this notation, one can ask if R(s,ω) > R(s0,ω), or not (is
the agent better oﬀ as a result of treatment s compared to treatment s0?). The diﬀerence
in subjective outcomes is R(s,ω) − R(s0,ω), and is a type of treatment eﬀect. Holding ω
ﬁxed holds all features of the agent ﬁxed except the treatment assigned, s. Since the units
of utility, R(s,ω), are arbitrary, one could instead record for each s and ω an indicator if
the outcome in s is greater or less than the outcome in s0, i.e. R(s,ω) > R(s0,ω), or not.
This is also a type of treatment eﬀect. Agents making decisions about treatment may be
only partially informed about realized payoﬀs at the time they make decisions. Modeling the
distinction between anticipated and realized outcomes is an integral part of the econometric
approach to causality and policy evaluation. A central feature of the econometric approach
to program evaluation is the evaluation of subjective valuations as perceived by decision
makers and not just objective valuations.
The term “treatment” is used in multiple ways in various literatures. In its most common
usage, a treatment assignment mechanism is a rule τ : Ω → S which assigns treatment to
each individual ω. The consequences of the assignment are the outcomes Y (s,ω), s ∈ S,
ω ∈ Ω. The collection of these possible assignment rules is T where τ ∈ T . There are two
aspects of a policy under this deﬁnition. The policy selects who gets what. More precisely,
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The econometric literature oﬀers a more nuanced deﬁnition of treatment assignment that
explicitly recognizes the element of choice by agent ω in producing the treatment assignment
rule. Treatment can include participation in activities such as schooling, training, a medical
therapy, adoption of a particular technology, and the like. Participation in treatment is
often a choice made by agents. Modeling this choice process is a distinctive feature of the
econometric approach. Under a more comprehensive deﬁnition of treatment, agents are
assigned incentives like taxes, subsidies, endowments and eligibility that aﬀect their choices,
but the agent chooses the treatment selected. Agent preferences, program delivery systems,
market structures, and the like might all aﬀect the choice of treatment. The treatment choice
mechanism may involve multiple actors and multiple decisions that result in an assignment of
ω to s. For example, s can be schooling while Y (s,ω) is earnings given schooling for agent ω.
A policy may be a set of payments that encourage schooling, as in the PROGRESA program
in Mexico, and the treatment in that case is choice of schooling with its consequences for
earnings. The s can also be a medical protocol that requires compliance by the patient
(choice behavior) to be eﬀective.
The following description of treatment assignment recognizes individual choices and con-
straints and is more suitable to policy evaluation that recognizes the role of choice by agents.
Specify assignment rules a ∈ A that map individuals ω into constraints (beneﬁts) b ∈ B un-
der diﬀerent mechanisms. In this notation, a constraint assignment mechanism a is a map
a : Ω → B deﬁned over the space of agents. The constraints may include endowments, eligi-
bility, taxes, subsidies, and other incentives that aﬀect agent choices of treatment. Elements
of b can be parameters of tax and beneﬁt schedules that aﬀect individual incentives. While
a more general setup is possible, where ω-speciﬁc schedules are assigned to person ω, the
cost of such generality is more complicated notation. For simplicity, I conﬁne attention to a
ﬁxed—but possibly very large—set of parameters deﬁned for all agents. The map a deﬁnes
the rule used to assign b ∈ B. It can include deterministic rules that give schedules mapping
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mechanisms that assign ω to an element of B. Random assignment mechanisms add addi-
tional elements of randomness to the environment. Abusing notation, when randomization
is used, redeﬁne Ω to include this new source of randomness.
Given b ∈ B allocated by constraint assignment mechanism a ∈ A, agents pick treat-
ments. Deﬁne treatment assignment mechanism τ : Ω × A × B → S as a map taking agent
ω ∈ Ω facing constraints b ∈ B assigned by mechanism a ∈ A into a treatment s ∈ S. (I
use redundant notation to clarify concepts.) In settings with choice, τ is the choice rule
used by agents where τ ∈ T , a set of possible choice rules. It is conventional to assume a
unique τ ∈ T is selected by the relevant decision makers, although that is not required in
this deﬁnition. A policy regime p ∈ P is a pair (a,τ) ∈ A×T that maps agents denoted by
ω into elements of s. In this notation, P = A × T .
Incorporating choice into the analysis of treatment eﬀects is an essential and distinctive
ingredient of the econometric approach to the evaluation of social programs. The traditional
treatment-control analysis in statistics equates mechanisms a and τ. An assignment in that
literature is an assignment to treatment, not an assignment of incentives and eligibility
for treatment with the agent making treatment choices. In this notation, the traditional
approach has only one assignment mechanism and treats noncompliance with it as a problem
rather than as a source of information on agent preferences, which is a central feature of the
econometric approach (Heckman & Smith, 1998). Thus, under full compliance, a : Ω → S
and a = τ, where B = S.
Policy invariance is a key assumption for any study of policy evaluation. It allows ana-
lysts to characterize outcomes without specifying how those outcomes are obtained. Policy
invariance has two aspects. The ﬁrst aspect is that, for a given b ∈ B (incentive schedule),
the mechanism a ∈ A by which ω is assigned a b (e.g. random assignment, coercion at the
point of a gun, etc.) and the incentive b ∈ B are assumed to be irrelevant for the values of re-
alized outcomes for each s that is selected. Second, for a given s for agent ω, the mechanism
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the values assumed by realized outcomes. Both assumptions deﬁne what economists mean
by policy invariance. Policy invariance was ﬁrst deﬁned and formalized by Marschak (1953)
and Hurwicz (1962).
Policy invariance allows one to describe outcomes by Y (s,ω) and ignore features of the
policy and choice environment in deﬁning outcomes. If one has to account for the eﬀects
of incentives and assignment mechanisms on outcomes, one must work with Y (s,ω,a,b,τ)
instead of Y (s,ω). The more complex description is the outcome associated with treatment
state s for person ω, assigned incentive package b by mechanism a which are arguments of
assignment rule τ. See Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a) for precise deﬁnitions of invariance.
The invariance assumptions state that for the same treatment s and agent ω, diﬀerent
constraint assignment mechanisms a and a0 and associated constraint state assignments b
and b0 produce the same outcome. For example, they rule out the possibility that the act of
randomization or the act of pointing a gun at an agent to secure cooperation with planner
intentions has an eﬀect on outcomes, given that the agent ends up in s. This is a strong
assumption.
The second invariance assumption invoked in the literature is that for a ﬁxed a and b, the
outcomes are the same, independent of the treatment assignment mechanism. This assump-
tion states that the actual mechanism used to assign treatment does not aﬀect the outcomes.
It rules out, among other things, social interactions, contagion and general equilibrium ef-
fects. Heckman (1992), Heckman & Smith (1998), Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999)
and Heckman & Vytlacil (2007b) discuss evidence against this assumption, and Heckman,
Lochner & Taber (1998a,b,c) show how to relax it.
If treatment eﬀects based on subjective evaluations are also considered, as is distinctive
of the econometric approach, it is necessary to broaden invariance assumptions to produce
invariance in rewards for certain policies and assignment mechanisms (see Heckman & Vyt-
lacil, 2007a). The required invariance assumptions state, for example, that utilities are
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(1992), Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999) and Heckman & Vytlacil (2007b) present evi-
dence against this assumption. Another invariance assumption rules out social interactions
in both subjective and objective outcomes. It is useful to distinguish invariance of objec-
tive outcomes from invariance of subjective outcomes. Randomization may aﬀect subjective
evaluations through its eﬀect of adding uncertainty into the decision process but it may not
aﬀect objective valuations. The econometric approach models how assignment mechanisms
and social interactions aﬀect choice and outcome equations rather than postulating a priori
that invariance postulates for outcomes are always satisﬁed for outcomes.
3.2.1 More General Criteria
There are many comparisons the analyst might make (see, e.g., Heckman, Smith & Clements,
1997). One might compare outcomes in diﬀerent sets that are ordered. Deﬁne argmaxs∈S{Y (s,ω)}
as the value of s that produces the maximal Y (s,ω) for s ∈ S. Thus if Y (s,ω) is scalar in-
come and one compares outcomes for s ∈ SA with outcomes for s0 ∈ SB, where SA∩SB = ∅,
then one might compare YsA to YsB, where
sA = argmaxs∈SA{Y (s,ω)} and sB = argmaxs∈SB{Y (s,ω)},
where I suppress the dependence of sA and sB on ω. This compares the best in one choice
set with the best in the other. Another contrast compares the best choice with the next
best choice. To do so, deﬁne s0 = argmaxs∈S{Y (s,ω)} and SB = S r {s0} and deﬁne the
treatment eﬀect as Ys0 −YsB. This is the comparison of the highest outcome over S with the
next best outcome. Many other individual-level comparisons might be constructed, and they
may be computed using personal preferences, R(ω), using the preferences of the planner,
RG, or using the preferences of the planner over the preferences of agents. Heckman (2005)
and Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a,b) present a comprehensive discussion of alternative criteria.
153.3 The Evaluation Problem
In the absence of a theory, there are no well deﬁned rules for constructing counterfactual
or hypothetical states or constructing the rules for assignment to treatment. Lewis (1974)
deﬁnes admissible counterfactual states without an articulated theory as “closest possible
worlds”. His deﬁnition founders on the lack of any meaningful metric or topology to mea-
sure “closeness” among possible worlds. Articulated scientiﬁc theories provide algorithms
for generating the universe of internally consistent, theory-consistent counterfactual states.
These hypothetical states are possible worlds. They are products of a purely mental activity.
Diﬀerent theories produce diﬀerent Y (s,ω) and diﬀerent assignment mechanisms.
The evaluation problem is that the analyst observes each agent in one of ¯ S possible
states. One does not know the outcome of the agent in other states that are not realized,
and hence cannot directly form individual level treatment eﬀects. The selection problem
arises because one only observes certain agents in any state. Thus one observes Y (s,ω) only
for agents who choose (or are chosen) to be in that state. In general, the outcomes of agents
found in S = s are not representative of what the outcomes of agents would be if they were
randomly assigned to s.
The evaluation problem is an identiﬁcation problem that arises in constructing the coun-
terfactual states and treatment assignment rules produced by these abstract models using
data. This is the second problem presented in Table 1. This problem is not precisely stated
until the data available to the analyst are precisely deﬁned. Diﬀerent areas of knowledge
assume access to diﬀerent types of data.
For each policy regime, at any point in time one observes agent ω in some state but not
in any of the other states. Thus one does not observe Y (s0,ω) for agent ω if one observes
Y (s,ω), s 6= s0. Let D(s,ω) = 1 if one observes agent ω in state s under policy regime
p, where I keep the policy regime p implicit to simplify the notation. In this notation,
D(s,ω) = 1 implies that D(s0,ω) = 0 for s 6= s0.






Without further assumptions, constructing an empirical counterpart to the individual level
causal eﬀect (3.1) is impossible from the data on (Y (ω),D(ω)), ω ∈ Ω, where D(ω) =
{(D(s,ω)}s∈S. This formulation of the evaluation problem is known as Quandt’s switching
regression model (Quandt, 1958) and is attributed in statistics to Neyman (1923), Cox (1958)
and Rubin (1978). A version of it is formulated in a linear equations context for a contin-
uum of treatments by Haavelmo (1943). The Roy model (1951) is another version of this
framework with two possible treatment outcomes (S = {0,1}) and a scalar outcome measure
and a particular assignment mechanism τ which is that D(1,ω) = 1[Y (1,ω) > Y (0,ω)],
where 1[·] means 1[·] ≥ 1 if the argument “·” is true and = 0 otherwise. Thus τ(ω) = 1
for ω satisfying Y (1,ω) ≥ Y (0,ω) and τ(ω) = 0 for ω satisfying Y (1,ω) < Y (0,ω). The
mechanism of selection depends on the potential outcomes. Agents choose the sector with
the highest income so the actual selection mechanism is not a randomization. Versions of
this model with more general self-selection mechanisms are surveyed in Heckman (1990),
Heckman & Smith (1998), Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a,b), and Abbring & Heckman (2007).
The evaluation literature in macroeconomics analyzes policies with universal coverage at
a point in time (e.g., a tax policy or social security) so that D(s,ω) = 1 for some s and all ω.
It uses time series data to evaluate the impacts of policies in diﬀerent periods and typically
uses mean outcomes (or mean utilities) to evaluate policies.
The problem of self selection is an essential aspect of the evaluation problem when data
are generated by the choices of agents. The agents making choices may be diﬀerent from
the agents receiving treatment (e.g., parents making choices for children). Such choices can
include compliance with the protocols of a social experiment as well as ordinary choices
about outcomes that people make in everyday life. As a consequence of self-selection, the
distribution of the Y (s,ω) observed are not the population distribution of randomly sampled
Y (s,ω).
17In the prototypical Roy model, the choice of treatment (including the decisions not to
attrite from the program) is informative on the relative evaluation of Y (s,ω). This point is
more general and receives considerable emphasis in the econometrics literature (e.g., Heck-
man & Smith, 1998; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007a). Choices by agents provide information on
subjective evaluations which are of independent interest.
The evaluation problem arises from the absence of information on outcomes for agent ω
other than the outcome that is observed. Even a perfectly implemented social experiment
does not solve this problem (Heckman, 1992). Randomization identiﬁes only one component
of {Y (s,ω)}s∈S for any agent. In addition, even with large samples and a valid randomiza-
tion, some of the s ∈ S may not be observed if one is seeking to evaluate new policies never
experienced.
There are two main avenues of escape from this problem. The ﬁrst avenue, featured
in explicitly formulated econometric models, often called “structural econometric analysis,”
is to model Y (s,ω) explicitly in terms of its determinants as speciﬁed by theory. This
entails describing the random variables characterizing ω and carefully distinguishing what
agents know and what the analyst knows. This approach also models D(s,ω) and the
dependence between Y (s,ω) and D(s,ω) produced from variables common to Y (s,ω) and
D(s,ω). The Roy model explicitly models this dependence. See Heckman & Honor´ e (1990)
and Heckman (2001) for a discussion of this model. Heckman (1990), Heckman & Smith
(1998), Carneiro, Hansen & Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman & Navarro (2005) extend
the Roy model. This approach stresses understanding the factors underlying outcomes and
the choice of outcome equations and their dependence. Empirical models explicitly based on
scientiﬁc theory pursue this avenue of investigation. Some statisticians call this the “scientiﬁc
approach” and are surprisingly hostile to it. See Holland (1986).
A second avenue of escape, and the one pursued in the recent treatment eﬀect literature,
redirects attention away from estimating the determinants of Y (s,ω) toward estimating some
population version of (3.1), most often a mean, without modeling what factors give rise to the
18outcome or the relationship between the outcomes and the mechanism selecting outcomes.
Agent valuations of outcomes are ignored. The statistical treatment eﬀect literature focuses
exclusively on policy problem P1 for the subset of outcomes that is observed. It ignores the
problem of forecasting a new policy in a new environment (problem P2), or a policy never
previously experienced (problem P3). Forecasting the eﬀects of new policies is a central task
of science.
3.4 New Population Level Treatment Parameters Introduced in
Economics
Economists and statisticians often draw on the same set of population level treatment pa-
rameters such as the average treatment eﬀect (ATE),(E (Y (s) − Y (s0))), treatment on the
treated, (TT) E((Y (s) − Y (s0)) | D(s) = 1), and treatment on the untreated (TUT)
E((Y (s) − Y (s0)) | D(s0) = 1). In this subsection, we keep the “ω” implicit to simplify
the notation. In some discussions in statistics, ATE is elevated to primacy as the causal
parameter. Economists use diﬀerent causal parameters for diﬀerent policy problems. The
distinction between the marginal and average return is a central concept in economics. It
is also of interest in medicine where the eﬀect of a treatment on the marginal patient is an
important question. It is often of interest to evaluate the impact of marginal extensions
(or contractions) of a program or treatment regime. Incremental cost-beneﬁt analysis is
conducted in terms of marginal gains and beneﬁts.
The eﬀect of treatment for people at the margin of indiﬀerence (EOTM) between
j and k, given that these are the best two choices available is deﬁned with respect to personal
preferences and with respect to choice-speciﬁc costs C (j). Formally, making the dependence
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This is the mean gain to agents indiﬀerent between treatments j and k, given that these are
the best two options available. In a parallel fashion, one can deﬁne EOTM
RG (Y (j) − Y (k))
using the preferences of another agent (e.g., the parent of a child, a paternalistic bureaucrat,
etc.). This could be a subjective evaluation made by a physician, for example. Analogous
parameters can be deﬁned for mean setwise comparisons (see Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005,
2007a,b). A generalization of this parameter called the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE),
introduced into the evaluation literature by Bj¨ orklund & Moﬃtt (1987) and further developed
in Heckman & Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007b) and Heckman, Urzua & Vytlacil (2006), plays
a central role in organizing and interpreting a wide variety of econometric and statistical
estimators as weighted averages of marginal treatment eﬀects.
Many other mean treatment parameters can be deﬁned depending on the choice of the
conditioning set. Analogous deﬁnitions can be given for median and other quantile versions
of these parameters (see Heckman, Smith & Clements, 1997; Abadie, Angrist & Imbens,
2002). Although means are conventional, distributions of treatment parameters are also of
considerable interest. I discuss distributional parameters in the next subsection.
Of special interest in policy analysis is the policy relevant treatment eﬀect (PRTE).
It is the eﬀect on aggregate outcomes of one policy regime p ∈ P compared to the eﬀect of
another policy regime. Under invariance assumptions,
PRTE: Ep (Y (s)) − Ep0 (Y (s)), where p,p
0 ∈ P,
20where the expectations are taken over diﬀerent spaces of policy assignment rules. Heckman
& Vytlacil (2007b) show how to identify this parameter.
Mean treatment eﬀects play a special role in the statistical approach to causality. They
are the centerpiece of the Holland (1986)–Rubin (1978) model and in many other studies
in statistics and epidemiology. Social experiments with full compliance and no disruption
can identify these means because of a special mathematical property of means. If one can
identify the mean of Y (j) and the mean of Y (k) from an experiment where j is the treatment
and k is the baseline, one can form the average treatment eﬀect for j compared to k. These
can be formed over two diﬀerent groups of agents. By a similar argument, TT or TUT can
be formed by randomizing over particular subsets of the population (those who would select
treatment and those who would not select treatment respectively), assuming full compliance
and no bias arising from the randomization. See Heckman (1992), Heckman & Vytlacil
(2007b) and Abbring & Heckman (2007).
The case for randomization is weaker if the analyst is interested in other summary mea-
sures of the distribution or the distribution itself. In general, randomization is not an eﬀective
procedure for identifying median gains, or the distribution of gains or many other key pa-
rameters. The elevation of population means as the primary “causal” parameters promotes
randomization as an ideal estimation method.
3.5 Distributions of Counterfactuals
Although means are traditional, the answers to many interesting evaluation questions re-
quire knowledge of features of the distribution of program gains other than some mean.
Thus it is of interest to know if some fraction of the population beneﬁts from a treatment
even if on average there is zero beneﬁt or a negative mean outcome. Let sp be shorthand
notation for assignment of ω to outcome s under policy p and the associated set of treat-
ment assignment mechanisms. For any two regimes p and p0, the proportion who beneﬁt
is Pr(Y (sp(ω),ω) ≥ Y (sp0(ω),ω)). This is called the voting criterion (Heckman, Smith
21& Clements, 1997). It requires knowledge of the joint distribution of the two arguments in
the inequality. Experiments, without further assumptions, can only identify marginal distri-
butions and not the joint distributions required to identify the voting criterion (Heckman,
1992).
For particular treatments within a policy regime p, it is also of interest to determine the
proportion who beneﬁt from j compared to k as Pr(Y (j,ω) ≥ Y (k,ω)). One might be inter-
ested in the quantiles of Y (sp(ω),ω)−Y (sp0(ω),ω) or of Y (j,ω)−Y (k,ω) for sp(ω) = j and
sp(ω) = k or the percentage who gain from participating in j (compared to k) under policy
p. More comprehensive analyses would include costs and beneﬁts. Distributional criteria are
especially salient if program beneﬁts are not transferrable or if restrictions on feasible social
redistributions prevent distributional objectives from being attained. Abbring & Heckman
(2007) present a comprehensive survey of approaches to identifying joint distributions of
counterfactual outcomes.
3.6 Accounting for Uncertainty
Systematically accounting for uncertainty introduces additional considerations that are cen-
tral to economic analysis but that are largely ignored in the statistical treatment eﬀect liter-
ature as currently formulated. Persons do not know the outcomes associated with possible
states not yet experienced. If some potential outcomes are not known at the time treatment
decisions are made, the best that agents can do is to forecast them with some rule. Even if,
ex post, agents know their outcome in a benchmark state, they may not know it ex ante, and
they may always be uncertain about what they would have experienced in an alternative
state. This creates a further distinction: that between ex post and ex ante evaluations of
both subjective and objective outcomes. The economically motivated literature on policy
evaluation makes this distinction. The statistical treatment eﬀect literature does not.
Because agents typically do not possess perfect information, a simple voting criterion
that assumes perfect foresight over policy outcomes may not accurately predict choices and
22requires modiﬁcation. Let Iω denote the information set available to agent ω. He or she
evaluates policy j against k using that information. Under an expected utility criterion,
agent ω prefers policy j over policy k if
E(R(Y (j,ω),ω) | Iω) ≥ E(R(Y (k,ω),ω) | Iω).
The proportion of people who prefer j is
PB (j | j,k) =
Z
1(E[R(Y (j,ω),ω) | Iω]) ≥ E (R(Y (k,ω),ω) | Iω) dµ(Iω), (3.4)
where µ(ω) is the distribution of ω in the population whose preferences over outcomes are
being studied. The voting criterion presented in the previous section is the special case where
the information set Iω contains (Y (j,ω),Y (k,ω)), so there is no uncertainty about Y (j) and
Y (k). Cunha, Heckman & Navarro (2005), Cunha, Heckman & Navarro (2006) and Abbring
& Heckman (2007) oﬀer examples of the application of this criterion. See Cunha, Heckman
& Navarro (2005, 2006) for computations regarding both types of joint distributions.
Accounting for uncertainty in the analysis makes it essential to distinguish between ex
ante and ex post evaluations. Ex post, part of the uncertainty about policy outcomes is
resolved although agents do not, in general, have full information about what their potential
outcomes would have been in policy regimes they have not experienced and may have only
incomplete information about the policy they have experienced (e.g., the policy may have
long-run consequences extending after the point of evaluation).
In advance of choosing an activity, agents may be uncertain about the outcomes that will
actually occur. They may also be uncertain about the full costs they will bear. In general
the agent’s information is not the same as the analyst’s, and they may not be nested. The
agent may know things in advance that the analyst may never discover. On the other hand,
the analyst, beneﬁtting from hindsight, may know some information that the agent does not
know when he is making his choices.
23Let Ia be the information set confronting the agent at the time choices are made and
before outcomes are realized. Agents may only imperfectly estimate consequences of their
choices. One can write the evaluation of s by an agent, using somewhat nonstandard nota-
tion, as
R(s,Ia) = µR (s,Ia) + υ (s,Ia),
reﬂecting that ex ante valuations are made on the basis of ex ante information where
µR (s,Ia) is determined by variables that are known to the econometrician and υ (s,Ia)
are components known to the agent but not the econometrician. Ex post evaluations can
also be made using a diﬀerent information set Iep reﬂecting the arrival of information after
the choice is realized. It is possible that
argmaxs∈S {R(s,Ia)} 6= argmaxs∈S {R(s,Iep)},
in which case there may be ex post regret or elation about the choice made.
The ex ante vs. ex post distinction is essential for understanding behavior. In envi-
ronments of uncertainty, agent choices are made in terms of ex ante calculations. Yet the
treatment eﬀect literature largely reports ex post returns.
The econometrician may possess yet a diﬀerent information set, Ie. Choice probabilities
computed against one information set are not generally the same as those computed against
another information set. Operating with hindsight, the econometrician may be privy to some
information not available to agents when they make their choices.
Ex post assessments of a program through surveys administered to agents who have
completed it may disagree with ex ante assessments of the program. Both may reﬂect
honest valuations of the program (Hensher, Louviere & Swait, 1999; Katz, Gutek, Kahn
& Barton, 1975). They are reported when agents have diﬀerent information about it or
have their preferences altered by participating in the program. Before participating in a
program, agents may be uncertain about the consequences of participation. An agent who
24has completed program j may know Y (j,ω) but can only guess at the alternative outcome
Y (k,ω) which they have not experienced. In this case, ex post “satisfaction” with j relative
to k for agent ω who only participates in k is synonymous with the following inequality,
R(Y (j,ω),ω) ≥ E(R(Y (k,ω),ω) | Iω), (3.5)
where the information is post-treatment. Survey questionnaires about “client” satisfaction
with a program capture subjective elements of program experience not captured by “ob-
jective” measures of outcomes that usually exclude psychic costs and beneﬁts. Heckman,
Smith & Clements (1997), Heckman & Smith (1998), and Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999)
present evidence on this question. Carneiro, Hansen & Heckman (2001, 2003), Cunha, Heck-
man & Navarro (2005, 2006) and Heckman & Navarro (2007) develop econometric methods
for distinguishing ex ante from ex post evaluations of social programs. See Abbring & Heck-
man (2007) for an extensive survey of this literature. Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a) discuss
the data needed to identify these criteria, and present examples of Roy models and their
extensions that allow for more general decision rules and imperfect information by agents.
They show how to use economic models to form treatment parameters.
3.7 A Speciﬁc Model
To crystallize the discussion in this section, it is helpful to present a prototypical econometric
model for policy evaluation. A patient can be given two courses of treatment “1” and “0”
with outcomes Y1(ω) and Y0(ω). I drop the “ω” notation to simplify the notation.
Y1 is an index of well being of the patient if treated; Y0 if untreated. At any point in time,
a person can be either treated or untreated. The decision to treat may be made on the basis
of the expected outcomes E(Y1 | I) and E(Y0 | I) and costs E(C | I) where the expectations
are those of the relevant decision maker – the patient, the doctor or possibly the parent if
the patient is a child. The costs might be the pain and suﬀering of the patient and/or the
25direct medical costs of the patient. For any problem, the costs C and expectations I are for
the relevant decision maker who decides who gets treatment.
From the point of view of the patient the expected utility or value of treatment is E(Y1 |
I) − E(C | I). The value of no treatment is E(Y0 | I). The expected net value is
E(Y1 | I) − E(C | I) − E(Y0 | I). (3.6)





1, if [E(Y1 | I) − E(C | I) − E(Y0 | I)] ≥ 0;
0, otherwise
(3.7)
or, more succinctly, D = 1[(E(Y1 | I) − E(C | I) − E(Y0 | I)) ≥ 0]. This is the generalized
Roy model developed in Cunha et al. (2005). See Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a) for a survey
of such models.
If the doctor makes the decision to treat, then the relevant C and I are those of the
doctor. Instead of a drug, the treatment can be schooling, migration, installation of a
technology and the potential outcomes are the counterfactuals with or without treatment.
The ex post treatment eﬀect is Y1 − Y0. The ex ante eﬀect is E(Y1 | I) − E(Y0 | I).
Behavioral or scientiﬁc theory motivates the construction of (Y0,Y1) and the decision to
assign treatment. The most basic model in economics is the Roy model previously mentioned.
The decision maker’s information is perfect. There are no direct costs of treatment (C = 0)
and the decision rule is
D = 1(Y1 ≥ Y0). (3.8)
Those who get treatment are the ones who beneﬁt from it. Thus the treated are a non-
random sample of the general population, and there is selection bias in using the treated
26sample to infer what the average person would experience if selected at random.
The econometric approach models the dependence between observed Y = DY1+(1−D)Y0
and D to suggest alternative estimators to identify causal parameters. Recent work identiﬁes
various mean treatment eﬀects, distributions of treatment eﬀects and the cost of treatment
including the pain and suﬀering of the patients.
Commonly used speciﬁcations are
Y1 = Xβ1 + U1
Y0 = Xβ0 + U0 (3.9)
C = Zγ + UC,
where (X,Z) are observed by the analyst and (U1,U0,UC) are unobserved. The patient
may know more or less than the analyst. Econometric models allow for the patient to
know more (observe more) than the analyst and analyze patient selection into treatment
accounting for the asymmetry in knowledge between the patient and the analyst. (Matching
assumes that, conditional on X and Z, D is independent of Y0,Y1 and so assumes a lot of
information is available to the analyst.) The Roy model sets γ = 0,UC = 0 and assumes
normality for (U0,U1). These distribution and parametric assumptions are relaxed in the
recent econometric literature (See Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007a, for a review).
The statistical approach does not model the treatment assignment rule or its relationship
to potential outcomes. The econometric approach makes the treatment assignment equation
the centerpiece of its focus and considers both objective and subjective valuations as well as
ex ante (E(Y1 | I),E(Y0 | I),E(C | I)) and ex post outcomes (Y1,Y0,C). For this model,
EOTM is E(Y1 − Y0 | E(Y1 | I) − E(Y0 | I) − E(C | I) = 0), i.e., the gain to people just
indiﬀerent between treatment and no treatment.
274 Counterfactuals, Causality and Structural Economet-
ric Models
The literature on policy evaluation in statistics sometimes compares econometric “struc-
tural” approaches with “treatment eﬀect” or “causal” models (see, e.g., Angrist & Imbens,
1995; Angrist, Imbens & Rubin, 1996). The comparison is not clear because the terms are
not precisely deﬁned. Heckman (2005) and Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a) formally deﬁne
“structural” models and use them as devices for generating counterfactuals. They consider
both outcome and treatment choice equations. This section presents a brief introduction to
the econometric approach and compares it with models for causal inference in statistics.
4.1 Generating Counterfactuals
The traditional model of econometrics is the “all causes” model. It writes outcomes as a
deterministic mapping of inputs to outputs:
y (s) = gs (x,us), (4.1)
where x and us are ﬁxed variables speciﬁed by the relevant economic theory. The notation
anticipates the distinction between observable (x) and unobservable (us) that is important
in empirical implementation. The role of the two types of variables in (4.1) is symmetric.
This notation allows for diﬀerent unobservables us to aﬀect diﬀerent outcomes. D is the
domain of the mapping gs : D −→ R
y, where Ry is the range of y. There may be multiple
outcome variables. All outcomes are explained in a functional sense by the arguments of
gs in (4.1). If one models the ex post realizations of outcomes, it is entirely reasonable to
invoke an all causes model since the realizations are known (ex post) and all uncertainty has
been resolved. Implicit in the deﬁnition of a function is the requirement that gs be “stable”
or “invariant” to changes in x and us. The gs function remains stable as its arguments are
28varied. Invariance is a key property of a causal model.
Equation (4.1) is a production function relating inputs (factors) to outputs. gs maps
(x,us) into the range of y or image of D under gs, where the domain of deﬁnition D may
diﬀer from the empirical support. Thus, equation (4.1) maps admissible inputs into possible
ex post outcomes. This notation allows for diﬀerent unobservables from a common list u to
appear in diﬀerent outcome equations.
A “deep structural” version of (4.1) models the variation of the gs in terms of s as a map
constructed from generating characteristics qs, x and us into outcomes:
y(s) = g (qs,x,us), (4.2)
where now the domain of g, D, is deﬁned for qs, x, us so that g : D −→ R
y. The components
qs provide the basis for generating the counterfactuals across treatments from a base set of
characteristics. g maps (qs,s,us) into the range of y, g : (qs,x,us) −→ Ry, where the domain
of deﬁnition D of g may diﬀer from the empirical support. In this speciﬁcation, diﬀerent
treatments s are characterized by diﬀerent bundles of a set of characteristics common across
all treatments. This framework provides the basis for solving policy problem P3 since new
policies (treatments) are generated from common characteristics, and all policies are put
on a common basis. If a new policy is characterized by known transformations of (qs, x,
us) that lie in the domain of deﬁnition of g, policy forecasting problem P3 can be solved.
The argument of the maps gs and g are part of the a priori speciﬁcation of a causal model.
Analysts may disagree about appropriate arguments to include in these maps.
One beneﬁt of a treatment eﬀect approach that focuses on problem P1 is that it works
solely with outcomes rather than inputs. However, it is silent on how to solve problems P2
and P3 and provides no basis for interpreting the population level treatment eﬀects.
Consider alternative models of schooling outcomes of pupils where s indexes the schooling
type (e.g., regular public, charter public, private secular and private parochial). The qs are
29the observed characteristics of schools of type s. The x are the observed characteristics of the
pupil. The us are the unobserved characteristics of both the schools and the pupil. If one can
characterize a proposed new type of school as a new package of diﬀerent levels of the same
ingredients x,qs, and us and one can identify (4.2) over the domain of the function deﬁned by
the new package, one can solve problem P3. If the same schooling input (same qs) is applied
to diﬀerent students (those with diﬀerent x) and one can identify (4.1) or (4.2) over the new
domain of deﬁnition, one can solve problem P2. By digging deeper into the “causes of the
eﬀects” one can do more than just compare the eﬀects of treatments in place with each other.
In addition, modeling the us and its relationship with the corresponding unobservables in the
treatment choice equation is highly informative on the choice of appropriate identiﬁcation
strategies.
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are sometimes called Marshallian causal functions. Assuming
that the components of (x,us) or (qs,x,us) are variation-free, a feature that may or may not
be produced by the relevant theory, one may vary each argument of these functions to get
a ceteris paribus causal eﬀect of the argument on the outcome. (See Heckman & Vytlacil,
2007a, for a precise deﬁnition of variation-free.) Some components may be variation-free
while others are not. These thought experiments are conducted for hypothetical variations.
Recall that the a priori theory speciﬁes the arguments in the causal functions and the list
of things held ﬁxed when a variable is manipulated.
Changing one coordinate while ﬁxing the others produces a Marshallian ceteris paribus
causal eﬀect of a change in that coordinate on the outcome variables. Varying qs ﬁxes
diﬀerent treatment levels. Variations in us among agents explain why people with the same
x characteristics respond diﬀerently to the same treatment s. The ceteris paribus variation
need not be for a single variable of the function. A treatment generally consists of a package
of characteristics and if one varies the package from qs to qs0 one gets diﬀerent treatment
eﬀects.
I use the convention that lower-case values are used to deﬁne ﬁxed values and upper-case
30notation denotes random variables. In deﬁning (4.1) and (4.2), I have explicitly worked with
ﬁxed variables that are manipulated in a hypothetical way as in the algebra of elementary
physics. In a purely deterministic world, agents respond to these non-stochastic variables.
Even if the world is uncertain, ex post, after the realization of uncertainty, the outcomes of
uncertain inputs are deterministic. Some components of us may be random shocks realized
after decisions about treatment are made.
Thus if uncertainty is a feature of the environment, (4.1) and (4.2) can be interpreted as
ex post realizations of the counterfactual as uncertainty is resolved. Ex ante versions may be
diﬀerent. From the point of view of agent ω with information set Iω, the ex ante expected
value of Y (s,ω) is
E (Y (s,ω) | Iω) = E (g (Q(s,ω),X(ω),U(s,ω)) | Iω), (4.3)
where Q(s,ω), X (ω), U(s,ω) are random variables generated from a distribution that
depends on the agent’s information set indexed by Iω.
The expectation might be computed using the information set of the relevant decision
maker (e.g., the parents in the case of the outcomes of the child) who might not be the agent
whose outcomes are measured. These random variables are drawn from agent ω’s subjective
distribution. This distribution may diﬀer from the distribution produced by “reality” or
nature if agent expectations are diﬀerent from objective reality. In the presence of intrinsic
uncertainty, the relevant decision maker acts on (4.3) but the ex post counterfactual is
Y (s,ω) = E(Y (s,ω) | Iω) + ν (s,ω), (4.4)
where ν (s,ω) satisﬁes E (ν (s,ω) | Iω) = 0. In this interpretation, the information set of
agent ω is part of the model speciﬁcation but the realizations come from a probability
distribution, and the information set includes the technology g. This representation clariﬁes
the distinction between deterministic ex post outcomes and intrinsically random ex ante
31outcomes. Abbring & Heckman (2007) survey econometric evaluation models accounting for
uncertainty.
This restatement of the basic deterministic model reconciles the “all causes” model (4.1)
and (4.2) with the intrinsic uncertainty model favored by some statisticians (see, e.g., Dawid,
2000, and the discussion following his paper). Ex ante, there is uncertainty at the agent (ω)
level but ex post there is not. The realizations of ν(s,ω) are ingredients of the ex post “all
causes” model, but not part of the subjective ex ante “all causes” model. The probability
law used by the agent to compute the expectations of g(Q(s,ω),X(ω),Us(ω)) may diﬀer
from the objective distribution that generates the observed data. In the ex ante “all causes”
model, manipulations of Iω deﬁne the ex ante causal eﬀects.
Thus, from the point of view of the agent, one can vary elements in Iω to produce
Marshallian ex ante causal response functions. The ex ante treatment eﬀect from the point
of view of the agent for treatment s and s0 is
E (Y (s,ω) | Iω) − E (Y (s
0,ω) | Iω). (4.5)
The data used to determine these functions may be limited in their support. In that
case analysts cannot fully identify the theoretical relationships over hypothetical domains
of deﬁnition. In addition, in the support, the components of X,U (s) and Iω may not be
variation free even if they are variation free in the hypothetical domain of deﬁnition of the
function. If the X in a sample are functionally dependent, it is not possible to identify the
Marshallian causal function with respect to variations in x over the available support even if
one can imagine hypothetically varying the components of x over the domains of deﬁnition
of the functions (4.1) or (4.2).
I next turn to an important distinction between ﬁxing and conditioning on factors that
gets to the heart of the distinction between causal models and correlational relationships.
This point is independent of any problem with the supports of the samples compared to the
32domains of deﬁnition of the functions.
4.2 Fixing vs. Conditioning
The distinction between ﬁxing and conditioning on inputs is central to distinguishing true
causal eﬀects from spurious causal eﬀects. In an important paper, Haavelmo (1943) made
this distinction in linear equation models. Haavelmo’s distinction is the basis for Pearl’s
(2000) book on causality that generalizes Haavelmo’s analysis to nonlinear settings. Pearl
deﬁnes an operator “do” to represent the mental act of ﬁxing a variable to distinguish it
from the action of conditioning, which is a statistical operation. If the conditioning set is
suﬃciently rich, ﬁxing and conditioning are the same in an ex post all causes model. Pearl
suggests a particular physical mechanism for ﬁxing variables and operationalizing causality,
but it is not central to his or any other deﬁnition of causality.
The distinction between ﬁxing and conditioning is most easily illustrated in the linear
regression model analyzed by Haavelmo (1943). Let y = xβ + u. While y and u are scalars,
x may be a vector. The linear equation maps every pair (x,u) into a scalar y ∈ R. Suppose
that the support of random variable (X,U) in the data is the same as the domain of (x,u)
that are ﬁxed in the hypothetical thought experiment and that the (x,u) are variation-free
(i.e., can be independently varied coordinate by coordinate). Abstract from the problem of
limited support that is discussed in the preceding section. Dropping the “ω ” notation for
random variables, write
Y = Xβ + U.
U is assumed to have a ﬁnite mean. Here “nature” or the “real world” picks (X,U) to
determine Y . X is observed by the analyst and U is not observed, and (X,U) are random
variables. This is an all causes model in which (X,U) determine Y . The variation generated
by the hypothetical model varies one coordinate of (X,U), ﬁxing all other coordinates to
produce the eﬀect of the variation on the outcome Y . Nature (as opposed to the model)
33may not permit such variation.
Formally, one can write this model deﬁned at the population level as a conditional ex-
pectation,
E (Y | X = x,U = u) = xβ + u.
Since conditioning is on both X and U, there is no further source of variation in Y . This
is a deterministic model that coincides with the “all causes” model. Thus on the support,
which is also assumed to be the domain of deﬁnition of the function, this model is the same
model as the deterministic, hypothetical model, y = xβ + u. Fixing X at diﬀerent values
corresponds to doing diﬀerent thought experiments with the X. Fixing and conditioning are
the same in this case.
If, however, one only conditions on X, one obtains
E (Y | X = x) = xβ + E (U | X = x). (4.6)
This relationship does not generate U-constant (Y,X) relationships. It generates only an
X−constant relationship. Unless one conditions on all of the “causes” (the right hand
side variables), the empirical relationship (4.6) does not identify causal eﬀect of X on Y .
The variation in X also moves the conditional mean of U given X. This analysis can be
generalized to a nonlinear model y = g (q,x,u) (See Pearl, 2000). It can be generalized to
account for the temporal resolution of uncertainty if one includes ν (s,ω) as an argument in
the ex post causal model. The outcomes can include both objective outcomes Y (s,ω) and
subjective outcomes R(Y (s,ω),ω).
Parallel to causal models for outcomes are causal models for the choice of treatment
(see Heckman & Vytlacil, 2007a). Accounting for uncertainty and subjective valuations of
outcomes (e.g., pain and suﬀering for a medical treatment) is a major contribution of the
econometric approach (see, e.g., Carneiro, Hansen & Heckman, 2003; Chan & Hamilton,
2006; Cunha, Heckman & Navarro, 2005, 2006; Cunha & Heckman, 2007; and Heckman
34& Navarro, 2007). The factors that lead an agent to participate in treatment s may be
dependent on the factors aﬀecting outcomes. Modeling this dependence is a major source of
information used in the econometric approach to construct counterfactuals from real data.
A parallel analysis can be made if the decision maker is not the same as the agent whose
objective outcomes are being evaluated.
4.3 The Econometric Model vs. the Neyman–Rubin Model
Many statisticians and social scientists use a model of counterfactuals and causality at-
tributed to Donald Rubin by Paul Holland (1986). The framework was developed in statistics
by Neyman (1923), Cox (1958) and others. Parallel frameworks were independently devel-
oped in psychometrics (Thurstone, 1927) and economics (Haavelmo, 1943; Quandt, 1958,
1972; Roy, 1951). The statistical treatment eﬀect literature originates in the statistical liter-
ature on the design of experiments. It draws on hypothetical experiments to deﬁne causality
and thereby creates the impression in the minds of many of its users that random assignment
is the most convincing way to identify causal models. Some would say it is the only way to
identify causal models.
Neyman and Rubin postulate counterfactuals {Y (s,ω)}s∈S without modeling the factors
determining the Y (s,ω) as is done in the econometric approach (see equations (4.1)–(4.4)).
Rubin and Neyman oﬀer no model of the choice of which outcome is selected. No lower
case, “all causes” model explicitly speciﬁed in this approach nor is there any discussion of
the social science or theory producing the outcomes studied.
In this notation, Rubin (1986) invokes versions of traditional econometric invariance
assumptions called “SUTVA” for Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption. Since he does
not develop choice equations or subjective evaluations, he does not consider the more general
invariance conditions for both objective and subjective evaluations discussed in section 3.2.
Invariance assumptions were developed in Cowles Commission econometrics and formalized
in Hurwicz (1962). They are surveyed in Heckman & Vytlacil (2007a).
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(R-1) {Y (s,ω)}s∈S , a set of counterfactuals deﬁned for ex post outcomes. It does not
analyze agent valuations of outcomes nor does it explicitly specify treatment selection rules,
except for contrasting randomization with nonrandomization;
(R-2) Invariance of counterfactuals for objective outcomes to the mechanism of assignment
within a policy regime;
(R-3) No social interactions or general equilibrium eﬀects for objective outcomes;
and
(R-4) There is no simultaneity in causal eﬀects, i.e., outcomes cannot cause each other
reciprocally.
Two further implicit assumptions in the application of the model are that P1 is the only
evaluation problem of interest and that mean causal eﬀects are the only objects of interest.
The econometric approach considers a wider array of policy problems than the statistical
treatment eﬀect approach. Its signature features are:
1. Development of an explicit framework for outcomes Y (s,ω), s ∈ S, measurements
and the choice of outcomes where the role of unobservables (“missing variables”) in
creating selection problems and justifying estimators is explicitly developed.
2. The analysis of subjective evaluations of outcomes R(s,ω), s ∈ S, and the use of choice
and compliance data to infer them.
3. The analysis of ex ante and ex post realizations and evaluations of treatments. This
analysis enables analysts to model and identify regret and anticipation by agents.
Points 2 and 3 introduce agent decision making into the treatment eﬀect literature.
4. Development of models for identifying and evaluating entire distributions of treatment
eﬀects (ex ante and ex post) rather than just the traditional mean parameters. These
36distributions enable analysts to determine the proportion of people who beneﬁt from
treatment, a causal parameter not considered in the statistical literature on treatment
eﬀects.
5. Models for simultaneous causality.
6. Deﬁnitions of parameters made without appeals to hypothetical experimental manip-
ulations.
7. Clariﬁcation of the need for invariance of parameters with respect to diﬀerent classes
of manipulations to answer diﬀerent classes of questions.
I now amplify these points.
Selection models deﬁned for potential outcomes with explicit treatment assignment mech-
anisms were developed by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974, 1976, 1978, 1979) in the
economics literature before the Neyman–Rubin model was popularized in statistics. The
econometric discrete choice literature (McFadden, 1974, 1981) uses counterfactual utilities
or subjective evaluations as did its parent literature in mathematical psychology (Thur-
stone, 1927, 1959). The model sketched in section 3.7 considers both choices and outcomes
of choices. Unlike the Neyman–Rubin model, these models do not start with the experiment
as an ideal but they start with well-posed, clearly articulated models for outcomes and treat-
ment choice where the unobservables that underlie the selection and evaluation problem are
made explicit. The hypothetical manipulations deﬁne the causal parameters of the model.
Randomization is a metaphor and not an ideal or “gold standard”.
In contrast to the econometric model, the Holland (1986) – Rubin (1978) deﬁnition of
causal eﬀects is based on randomization. The analysis in Rubin’s 1976 and 1978 papers is a
dichotomy between randomization (“ignorability”) and non-randomization, and not an ex-
plicit treatment of particular selection mechanisms in the non-randomized case as developed
in the econometrics literature. There is no explicit discussion of treatment selection rules like
37(3.8) and their relationship with realized outcomes. Even under ideal conditions, random-
ization cannot answer some very basic questions, such as what proportion of a population
beneﬁts from a program (Heckman, 1992). See Carneiro, Hansen & Heckman (2001, 2003),
where this proportion is identiﬁed using choice data and/or supplementary proxy measures.
See also Cunha, Heckman & Navarro (2005, 2006) and Cunha & Heckman (2007). Abbring
& Heckman (2007) discuss this work. In practice, contamination and cross-over eﬀects make
randomization a far from sure-ﬁre solution even for constructing E(Y1−Y0). See the evidence
on disruption bias and contamination bias arising in randomized trials that is presented in
Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999) and Heckman, Hohmann, Smith & Khoo (2000).
Many leading causal analysts conﬂate the three points of Table 1. The analysis of Holland
(1986) illustrates this point and the central role of the randomized trial to the Holland-Rubin
analysis. After explicating the “Rubin model,” Holland gives a very revealing illustration
that conﬂates the ﬁrst two tasks of Table 1. He claims that there can be no causal eﬀect
of gender on earnings because analysts cannot randomly assign gender. This statement
confuses the act of deﬁning a causal eﬀect (a purely mental act) with empirical diﬃculties
in estimating it. These are tasks 1 and 2 in Table 1.
As another example of the same point, Rubin (1978, p. 39) denies that it is possible to
deﬁne a causal eﬀect of sex on intelligence because a randomization cannot in principle be
performed. “Without treatment deﬁnitions that specify actions to be performed on experi-
mental units, I cannot unambiguously discuss causal eﬀects of treatments” (Rubin, 1978, p.
39). In this and many other passages in the statistics literature, a causal eﬀect is deﬁned
by a randomization. Issues of deﬁnition and identiﬁcation are confused. This confusion
continues to ﬂourish in the literature in applied statistics. For example, Berk, Li & Hickman
(2005) echo Rubin and Holland in insisting that if an experiment cannot “in principle” be
performed, a causal eﬀect cannot be deﬁned. The local average treatment eﬀect “LATE”
parameter of Imbens & Angrist (1994) is deﬁned by an instrument and conﬂates tasks 1
and 2 (deﬁnition and identiﬁcation). Imbens & Angrist (1994) use instrumental variables
38as surrogates for randomization. Heckman & Vytlacil (1999, 2005) and Heckman, Urzua &
Vytlacil (2006) deﬁne the LATE parameter abstractly and separate issues of deﬁnition of
parameters from issues of identiﬁcation.
The act of deﬁnition is logically distinct from the acts of identiﬁcation and inference. A
purely mental act can deﬁne a causal eﬀect of gender. That is a separate task from identifying
the causal eﬀect. The claim that causality can only be determined by randomization reiﬁes
randomization as the “gold standard” of causal inference.
The econometric approach to causal inference is more comprehensive than the Neyman–
Rubin model of counterfactuals. It analyzes models of the choice of counterfactuals {D(s,ω)}s∈S
and the relationship between choice equations and the counterfactuals. The D(s,ω) are ex-
plicitly modeled as generated by the collection of random variables (Q(s,ω),C (s,ω),Y (s,ω) | Iω),
s ∈ S, where Q(s,ω) is the characteristic of treatment s for agent ω, C (s,ω) are costs and
{Y (s,ω)}s∈S are the outcomes and the “|” denotes that these variables are deﬁned condi-
tional on Iω (the agent’s information set). (Recall the discussion in section 3.7.) If other
agents make treatment assignment decisions, then the determinants of D(s,ω) are modiﬁed
according to what is in their information set. The variables determining choices are analyzed.
Modeling Y (s,ω) in terms of the characteristics of treatment, and of the treated, fa-
cilitates comparisons of counterfactuals and derived causal eﬀects across studies where the
composition of programs and treatment group members may vary. It also facilitates the
construction of counterfactuals on new populations and the construction of counterfactu-
als for new policies. The Neyman–Rubin framework focuses exclusively on population level
mean “causal eﬀects” or treatment eﬀects for policies actually experienced and provides no
framework for extrapolation of ﬁndings to new environments or for forecasting new policies
(problems P2 and P3).
394.4 Simultaneous Causality
One major limitation of the Neyman–Rubin model is that it is recursive. It does not model
causal eﬀects of outcomes that occur simultaneously. Since Haavelmo (1943, 1944), econome-
tricians have used simultaneous equations theory to deﬁne causality in nonrecursive models
where causes are simultaneous and interdependent. Heckman (2005) and Heckman & Vyt-
lacil (2007a) present extensive discussions of simultaneous causality.
Consider the following nonlinear simultaneous equations system where identiﬁcation of
causal eﬀects can be deﬁned by exclusion of variables. Let (Y1,Y2) be a pair of jointly
determined (internal) variables with externally speciﬁed variables X1, X2, U1, U2. Externally
speciﬁed variables are variables that are speciﬁed independently of the system being analyzed.
(Y1,Y2) are internal variables determined by the system. We may represent the system
determining the internal variables as
Y1 = g1 (Y2,X1,X2,U1) (4.7)





is the causal eﬀect of Y2 on Y1, holding X1, X2, and U1 ﬁxed.
This is Haavelmo’s deﬁnition of the causal eﬀect applied to a simultaneous equations sys-
tem. Assuming the existence of local solutions, one can solve these equations to obtain
the internal variables in terms of the external variables Y1 = ϕ1 (X1,X2,U1,U2) and Y2 =
ϕ2 (X1,X2,U1,U2). These functions can be determined from the data under standard exo-
geneity conditions for X (see, e.g., Amemiya, 1985). By the chain rule, one can deﬁne the
causal eﬀect of Y2 on Y1, using exclusion (
∂g1
∂X1 = 0 for all (Y2,X1,X2,U1)) and identify the
















40One may deﬁne causal eﬀects of Y1 on Y2 using partials with respect to X2 if there is exclusion
with respect to X2 in equation (4.8).
A simple example is the simultaneous equations model of Haavelmo (1944)
Y1 = γ12Y2 + b11X1 + b12X2 + U1 (4.9)
Y2 = γ21Y1 + b21X1 + b22X2 + U2. (4.10)









is full rank, one can solve out for the internal variables (Y1,Y2) as a function of external
variables (X1,X2,V1,V2):
Y1 = π11X1 + π12X2 + V1 (4.11)
Y2 = π21X1 + π22X2 + V2, (4.12)
where (X1,X2) is assumed to be statistically independent of (V1,V2). We can estimate the
πij, i,j = 1,2, by ordinary least squares. If b11 = 0, then X1 aﬀects Y1 only through its eﬀect







From the deﬁnition of π11,π21 as coeﬃcients of the solution of the external variables in terms




41Thus one can deﬁne and identify the causal eﬀect of Y2 on Y1. This is the method developed
by Tinbergen (1930) and when applied as an estimation method is called indirect least
squares.
The intuition is simple. Because X1 is excluded from (4.9) (or (4.7)), it can be used to
shift Y2 in that equation keeping X2 and U1 ﬁxed. This enables the analyst to determine the
causal eﬀect of Y2 on Y1 holding the other determinants of Y1 ﬁxed.
This deﬁnition of causal eﬀects in an interdependent system generalizes the recursive def-
initions of causality featured in the statistical treatment eﬀect literature (Pearl, 2000). The
key to the more general econometric deﬁnition is manipulation of external inputs and exclu-
sion, not a particular method such as randomization, matching, or instrumental variables.
One can use the population simultaneous equations model to deﬁne the class of admissible
variations and address problems of deﬁnitions (task 1 of table 1). If, for a given model, the
functions (4.7) or (4.8) shift when external variables are manipulated, or if external vari-
ables cannot be independently manipulated, causal eﬀects of one internal variable on another
cannot be deﬁned within that model.
5 Marschak’s Maxim and the Relationship Between
the Econometric Literature and the Statistical Treat-
ment Eﬀect Literature: A Synthesis
The absence of explicit models of outcomes and choice is a prominent feature of the statistical
treatment eﬀect literature. Scientiﬁcally well-posed models make explicit the assumptions
used by analysts regarding preferences, technology, the information available to agents, the
constraints under which they operate, and the rules of interaction among agents in market
and social settings and the sources of variability among agents. These explicit features
make econometric models useful vehicles (a) for interpreting empirical evidence using theory;
42(b) for collating and synthesizing evidence across studies using economic theory; (c) for
measuring the various eﬀects of policies; and (d) for forecasting the welfare and direct eﬀects
of previously implemented policies in new environments and the eﬀects of new policies.
These features are absent from the modern treatment eﬀect literature. At the same time,
that literature makes fewer statistical assumptions in terms of independence, functional form,
exclusion and distributional assumptions than the standard structural estimation literature
in econometrics. These are the attractive features of this approach.
However, the econometric literature has advanced greatly in recent years in terms of
producing a robust version of its product. Major advances summarized in Powell (1994),
Heckman & Vytlacil (2007b), and Matzkin (2007) have relaxed the strong parametric as-
sumptions that characterized the early econometric literature.
In reconciling these two literatures, I reach back to a neglected but important paper
by Marschak (1953). Marschak noted that for many speciﬁc questions of policy analysis,
it is not necessary to identify fully speciﬁed models that are invariant to classes of policy
modiﬁcations. All that may be required for any policy analysis are combinations of subsets
of the structural parameters, corresponding to the parameters required to forecast particular
policy modiﬁcations, which are often much easier to identify (i.e., require fewer and weaker
assumptions).
I call this principle Marschak’s Maxim in honor of this insight. The modern statistical
treatment eﬀect literature implements Marschak’s Maxim where the policies analyzed are
the treatments available under a particular policy regime and the goal of policy analysis is
restricted to evaluating policies in place (task 1 in Table 1) and not in forecasting the eﬀects
of new policies or the eﬀects of old policies on new environments. What is often missing from
the literature on treatment eﬀects is a clear discussion of the policy question being addressed
by the particular treatment eﬀect being identiﬁed and why it is interesting.
Population mean treatment parameters are often identiﬁed under weaker conditions than
are traditionally assumed in structural econometric analysis. Thus, to identify the average
43treatment eﬀect given X for s and s0 one only requires E(Y (s,ω) | X = x) −E (Y (s0,ω)
| X = x). Under invariance conditions about outcome equations, this parameter answers the
policy question of determining the average eﬀect on outcomes of moving an agent from s0 to
s when there are no social interaction or contagion eﬀects. The parameter is not designed
to evaluate a whole host of other policies. One does not have to know the functional form
of the generating gs functions nor does X have to be exogenous. One does not have to
invoke strong conditions about invariance of the choice equations. However, if one seeks to
identify E(Y (s,ω) | X = x,D(s,ω) = 1) − E(Y (s0,ω) | X = x,D(s,ω) = 1), one needs to
invoke invariance of choice equations recognizing the conditioning on a choice variable. No
conditioning on a choice is required in deﬁning average treatment eﬀects.
Treatment eﬀects are causal eﬀects for particular policies that move agents from s ∈ S
to s0 ∈ S, s0 6= s, keeping all other features of the agent and environment the same. These
eﬀects are designed to address policy problem P1. Treatment eﬀects and causal models
can be generated from explicit economic models and are more easily interpreted. Invariant,
explicitly formulated, economic models are useful for addressing policy problems P2 and P3:
extrapolation and predicting the eﬀects of new policies, respectively.
If the goal of an analysis is to predict outcomes, and the environment is stable, then accu-
rate predictions can be made without causal or structural parameters. Consider Haavelmo’s
analysis of ﬁxing vs. conditioning discussed in section 4.2. He analyzed the linear regression
model Y = Xβ + U and deﬁned the causal eﬀect of X on Y as the U-constant eﬀect of
variations in X. If the goal of the analysis is to predict the eﬀect of X on Y , and if the
environment is stable so that the historical data have the same distribution as the data in
the forecast sample, least squares projections are optimal predictors under mean square error
criteria (see, e.g., Goldberger, 1964). One does not need to separate out the causal eﬀect of
X on Y , β, from the eﬀect of X on the unobservables operating through E(U | X).
Marschak’s Maxim urges analysts to formulate the problem being addressed clearly and
to use the minimal ingredients required to solve it. The treatment eﬀect literature addresses
44the problem of comparing treatments under a particular policy regime for a particular en-
vironment. The original econometric pioneers considered treatments under diﬀerent policy
regimes and with diﬀerent environments. As analysts ask more diﬃcult questions, it is
necessary to specify more features of the models being used to address the questions.
Marschak’s Maxim is an application of Occam’s Razor to policy evaluation. For certain
classes of policy interventions, designed to answer problem P1, the treatment eﬀect approach
may be very powerful and more convincing than explicitly formulated models because it
entails fewer assumptions. However, as previously noted, considerable progress has been
made in relaxing the parametric structure assumed in the early economic models. As the
treatment eﬀect literature is extended to address the more general set of policy forecasting
problems entertained in the econometric literature, including the evaluation of subjective
outcomes, and the parametric assumptions of the original econometric approach are relaxed,
the two literatures will merge in a creative synthesis.
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